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1 Background to this study 
This report serves to restate and update the findings of AURES report D4.1-UK published in March 2016 
(Fitch-Roy and Woodman 2016)1. While the fundamental design of the UK auctions system remains largely 
unchanged, substantial shifts in the policy context and the additional experience and data from two further 
auction processes (one completed, another in progress at the time of writing) warrant an updated evaluation 
and report. 
The UK has been a frontrunner in the use of RES auctions. From early experiences with the Non Fossil-Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO) auctions in the 1990s to the current auction system, first announced in 2011, the use of 
competitive allocation mechanisms has been central to the UK’s approach to supporting new renewable 
electricity generation projects.  
However, the use and design of renewable auctions remain a source of policy debate and discussion in the 
UK. For example, the potential for a combination of auction dynamics and the application of a cap on the 
volume of ‘fuelled’ renewable technologies led to higher than necessary support costs being awarded to 
some projects has been the subject of an enquiry by the national audit office (NAO 2018). 
This remainder of this report adopts the following structure: 
 Section 2 provides an updated overview of the UK electricity sector 
 Section 3 outlines the key features of the UK RES auction system, including recent rule changes 
 Section 4 updates our earlier evaluation of the programme in light of recent auctions 
 Section 5 concludes 
                                                             
1 http://auresproject.eu/publications/auctions-renewable-energy-support-in-the-united-kingdom-instruments-and-
lessons-learnt 
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2 Overview of the United Kingdom electricity sector 
The UK has a population of 66 million (Office for National Statistics 2018) and in 2017 its final energy 
consumption was 149 Mtoe. Electricity made up 18.5% of the UK’s final energy consumption and the UK total 
generating capacity in 2017 is 103.5GW (BEIS 2019c; Ofgem 2018). The UK has liberalised electricity 
generation and retail markets. However, despite some recent trends increases in independent electricity 
supply and a general trend away from vertical integration, electricity generation and supply remains 
moderately concentrated with the domestic and non-domestic electricity markets in GB (the UK excluding 
Northern Ireland) exhibiting an Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 1,034 (Ofgem 2018). However, this HHI 
is well below the threshold of 2,000 the European Commission deems to indicate a highly concentrated 
market and places GB among the least concentrated European markets (CEER 2018) . Together, the six 
largest retailers account for more than 76% of domestic electricity supply and the eight largest generation 
companies account for 71% of UK generation volumes (Ofgem 2018). A surge in new entrants to the UK 
electricity retail market has slowed since 2016 as greater price volatility and increasing supply costs have 
put smaller retailers under pressure. From 2016 onwards, a number of such independents have exited the 
market, either by choice or the revocation and reallocation of the supply license by the regulator.  
The expansion of renewable electricity has been supported by public policy since 1990. The Non Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (auction) ran from 1990 – 1998. This was replaced by the Renewables Obligation (RO) (quota) in 
2002. Following a slow start in encouraging renewables deployment, changes to the design of the RO in 
2008/09 led to a greater uptake, largely as a result of investor risk being reduced. Following some media and 
public opposition to the costs of subsidising renewables, and the unexpectedly fast growth of the solar pv 
sector, the ruling Conservative Government decided to exclude the more publically unpopular technologies 
from further support.  Large scale solar (>5MW) has been excluded from RO support since April 2015 and 
onshore wind from April 2016. The RO was closed to all new projects in 2017. Its replacement - the Contracts 
for Difference scheme - is an auction mechanism, and the first round of bidding took place in late 2014, with 
the results announced in February 2015.  The exclusion of onshore wind with planning consent from the third 
allocation round (2019) has been challenged in the courts by Banks on the grounds that preventing them 
from bidding will not result in lowest cost decarbonisation, and therefore that it contradicts stated 
Government policy (Banks Group 2019).  A legal decision is yet to be made on the case. 
Small scale renewable generation (<5 MW) was supported by a Feed in Tariff from 2010, although this 
scheme closed to new projects on 31 March 2019. Due to changes made to the licences required to operate 
an electricity supply business, from 2020, sub-5MW installations will be able to access export tariffs under a 
net-metering scheme known as the Smart Export Guarantee (HM Government 2019). However, the legislation 
only compels suppliers with more than 150,000 customers and does not specify a minimum level for the 
tariffs offered.  The CFD scheme is open for projects under 5 MW if they are an eligible technology. 
The UK enjoys a location on the windy Atlantic fringe of Europe and has excellent renewable energy 
resources. Under EU Directive 2009/28/EC, the UK is bound to meet 15% of energy consumption across all 
sectors from renewable sources by 2020 which translates to approximately 30% in the electricity sector 
(DECC 2009). Recent growth in renewable electricity has been strong, largely driven by on- and offshore wind, 
and in 2017, renewables accounted for 29.3% of electricity generation. However, overall renewables supplied 
only 10.2% of final energy consumption, with slow progress in heat and transport making achievement of the 
15% target seem unlikely by 2020 (BEIS 2019c).  
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Figure 1: UK progress towards its Renewable Energy Directive 2020 target (Eurostat Code: T2020_31) and 
increasing proportion of electricity from renewable sources (Eurostat) 
 
Figure 2: UK renewable electricity generation (GWh/yr) (Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics table 6.4) 
 
The UK as an island is largely electrically isolated from mainland Europe. However, the UK does have 4GW 
of interconnection capacity with France, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Despite the decision taken by referendum in 2016 to leave the European Union more interconnectors are 
planned in the future, possibly to Belgium, Norway, France and Denmark, meaning that the UK could become 
increasingly integrated into the wider European electricity network. 
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Figure 3: Current and planned UK-mainland electrical connection projects (data source: Ofgem 2019) 
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3 Characteristics of RES-E auctions in the United Kingdom 
The CfD auctions held in the UK are multi-unit, sealed-bid, uniform price auctions for 15 year contracts for 
generation. The auction involves the Government setting technology-specific ceiling prices known as 
‘administrative strike prices’ intended to represent similar investor returns to the previous support 
mechanism, the Renewables Obligation (DECC 2013). Participants in the auction are required to bid at or 
below these ceiling prices, with lowest bidding projects being awarded contracts. The Government can also 
set technology capacity minima and maxima. The auction system runs two independent tracks with 
dedicated budgets: “pot 1” auctions include established technologies such as onshore wind and solar PV 
while “pot 2” auctions include less established technologies such as offshore wind. Within the current 
framework, the two auctions can be held independently or simultaneously. There is also a third technology 
Pot – Pot 3 – for biomass conversion though this has yet to be included in an auction. 
Auctioned volumes are determined by strict budgetary constraints with some notable features arising from 
the way the budgets are apportioned. Budgets are capped year-by-year rather than the overall spending 
implications of the auction. Essentially, in addition to meeting the overall affordability criterion, a winning bid 
must not breach the budget cap for any of the years for which a cap has been set. Not knowing into which 
years other projects may apply may complicate the assessment of the likely overall competitiveness of a 
bidder’s project.  See Section 3.3 for a more detailed description of the auction process. 
 Government goals 
The broad objectives of the CfD auction are closely linked to the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) process 
started by the UK Government in 2009 and which aimed to deliver the three familiar objectives of ensuring 
security of supply, decarbonising the electricity system, including meeting its EU RED target, and doing so at 
least cost to consumers.  
 
Coupled with this is the Government’s desire to create an attractive environment for investment in new 
nuclear plants. Under EU State Aid rules, nuclear stations would not have been able to be awarded a subsidy 
unless other low carbon technologies were equally subsidised. As a result, the CfD system is applied to both 
renewables and nuclear power, although the price for the contract awarded to the only nuclear station 
currently under construction was determined through bilateral negotiation between the Government and 
developer, EDF, rather than through a competitive bidding system. 
 
The original policy objectives of the CfD auctions for renewables were primarily to introduce competition 
within technology groups as a means of limiting producer surplus and so limit the cost to consumers of 
supporting renewables generation. There is an intention to move towards technology neutrality in the future 
(unspecified date) (DECC 2011). More recently, however, the auctions system has become much more 
closely aligned to the UK’s Industrial Strategy, particularly in the emphasis given to one of the key sectors 
targeted in the Strategy, offshore wind (BEIS 2017c).  
 The contract 
Auction winners are offered a Contract for Difference (CfD), a private-law contract between the generator and 
a publicly-owned corporation known as the Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC). CfDs are in effect a 
financial instrument which guarantees additional revenue to those from selling power into the wholesale 
power market. Additional payments per MWh are calculated as the difference between the contract or ‘strike 
price’ (determined through the auction) and a bespoke index of the wholesale market price known as the 
‘reference price’,2 (Figure 4). In instances where the wholesale power price is higher than the strike price, the 
contract requires that the generator makes payments to the contract counterparty.  
                                                             
2 A seasonally calculated ‘baseload price’ for dispatchable generation and a day ahead hourly price for ‘intermittent’ 
generators: See Table 2 for more detail. 
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The contract counterparty, a government-owned independent corporation, oversees a system of levies 
through which the overall support costs are recouped from consumers via electricity suppliers.  
 
Figure 4: Functioning of the CfD 
 
 Auction process 
The Secretary of State can set a minimum budget reservation (either in MW or ££s) for specific technologies, 
or groups of technologies. In the first allocation round there was a minimum of 10MW for wave and tidal 
stream technologies. 
The Secretary can also set a maximum budget reservation (either in MW or ££s for specific technologies or 
groups of technologies. No maxima were set in the first allocation round but a 150MW cap was placed on 
‘fuelled’ technologies (mainly biomass) in the second round (BEIS 2017a). 
Applicants can submit flexible bids into the auction process. The flexibility applies to the capacity, price 
and/or delivery date of a project. In effect, it means that project developers can put forward multiple (up to 
ten) applications for the same project with various combinations of capacity and delivery date, each with its 
own unique price. The lowest priced bid will be considered first, but in the event it is not funded due to 
budgetary constraint, a smaller capacity (but higher priced) bid will be considered and so on (DECC 2014a). 
In this way, it is hoped that bidders are able to present the full range of viable project permutations that can 
be selected to suit the budgetary limits. However, the implications for bidding strategy are not clearly 
understood.as individual bids are not publically available 
The auction process is rather complex and involves several steps3: 
1. If applications do not exceed the applicable budget pot, applicants will be offered a CfD at the 
prevailing Administrative Strike Price (unconstrained allocation) 
2. An auction is triggered if applications exceed the available budget pot, or if the capacity of 
technologies subject to the maximum limit is exceeded. 
3. If an auction is necessary, the Delivery Body notifies the applications inviting sealed bids. Applicants 
have 5 working days to submit a bid stating the strike price that they are willing to accept for the 
project and the delivery year for the project (ie the Target Commissioning Date) 
                                                             
3 For a more comprehensive description of the process, please see the earlier AURES report on the UK system: (Fitch-
Roy and Woodman 2016) 
  
 11  
4. If the Secretary of State has stated a minimum capacity for any technology, bids for that technology 
are ranked by bid price and accepted up to the minimum capacity. Any projects that are not accepted 
at this stage are considered with the other projects in that technology’s relevant pot the highest price 
up to the minimum sets the price for all projects subject to that minimum in each delivery year;  
5. For each pot all bids excluding those accepted as part of the minimum are ranked by price; 
6. Starting from the lowest price bid, the budget impact of the bids (in addition to the bids accepted 
under a minimum) is assessed for each bid in ascending price order for all years for which budget 
constraint has been announced in the Budget Notice; 
7. If the budget for any year is exceeded, the project’s alternative ‘flexible’ configurations are tested 
against the budget. If the budget cannot be made to work with the alternatives, the project is rejected. 
Bids which exceed a capacity maximum, if it is set, are also rejected; 
8. The process is continued until there are no more projects or no more budget in any year; 
9. The award prices are the marginal prices within each year up to the technology’s ceiling price or the 
marginal price within a capacity minimum. Effectively, each delivery year has an independent uniform 
price for all awarded projects within that delivery year. 
Figure 5 shows the decision tree outlining how awards are made, while Figure 6 shows the selection process 
(‘stacking’) for bids during the auction and how prices emerge from the process: 
 
 
Figure 5: CfD auction decision tree (DECC 2014a) 
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Figure 6: Auction stack procedure 
 
 Design details of UK RES-E auctions 
The Government’s legally-binding commitment to holding RE auctions was confirmed in the Energy Act 2013. 
The details of implementation are set out in various subsequent legislative instruments and Regulations. 
Successful bidders are offered a 15 year fixed price contract for output. Two auctions have been held to-date 
(AR1 2015 and AR2 2017). A third (AR3) is currently underway (2019). The following tables outline the main 
characteristics of the auction system and the detailed design elements as elaborated in AURES report  
Table 1: Main characteristics of auctions and framework conditions 
Characteristics  Description 
Characteristics of the 
national electricity market 
Electricity generation and supply is privately owned and the market is 
liberalised. The sector is dominated by 6 large, mainly vertically integrated 
companies (The Big Six). These 6 companies are responsible for 76% of 
domestic supply, and around 61% of generation (Ofgem 2018). 
Electricity is traded through the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements (BETTA). The transmission system is operated by National 
Grid, and distribution networks are owned and operated by 14 Distribution 
Network Operators. 
Name of auction scheme Contracts for Difference (CfD) allocation rounds 
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Contractual counterparty 
(auctioneer? provider of 
support?) 
The contract counterparty is the Low Carbon Contracts Company 
(lowcarboncontracts.uk), which is a privately limited company wholly owned 
by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). 
Main features  
(e.g. cross-border 
auction?/multinational 
auction?) 
Multi-technology auctions for projects based in England, Wales and Scotland.  
Auctions are constrained by annual budget caps (as shown in the next 
section).  
AR2 (2017) had a cap of 150MW for fuelled technologies (biomass, advanced 
conversion technologies (ACT4) etc), and AR3  (2019) auction included a 
capacity target of 6GW for all technologies. 
Technology focus and 
differentiation (eligible 
technologies) 
Technologies are divided into 2 ‘Pots’ according to their technological 
maturity. Pot 1 is for established technologies, Pot 2 for less established 
technologies. There is an additional pot (Pot 3) for biomass conversion which 
has not been included in any auction to date. 
There have been some slight amendments in the requirements for 
technologies eligible for auctions, particularly the requirement for CHP (or 
not) in Pot 2 projects. AR3 includes a new category of Remote Island Wind, 
an exception to the policy that there should be no further subsidies for 
onshore wind. 
The 2015 Auction (AR1) was for Pots 1 and 2 and covered: 
Pot 1: Onshore wind (>5MW), solar pv >5MW, Energy from Waste with CHP, 
Hydro >5MW and <50MW, Landfill Gas, Sewage Gas 
Pot 2: Offshore wind, Tidal Stream, Wave, ACT with or without CHP, Anaerobic 
Digestion with or without CHP >5MW, Dedicated Biomass with CHP, 
Geothermal with or without CHP 
The 2017 Auction (AR2) was for Pot 2 technologies only:  
Offshore Wind, ACT with or without CHP, Anaerobic Digestion with or without 
CHP, Dedicated Biomass with CHP, Wave, Tidal Stream, Geothermal with or 
without CHP 
The 2019 Auction (AR3) was also for Pot 2 technologies only:  
ACTs, Anaerobic Digestion >5MW, Dedicated Biomass with CHP, Geothermal, 
Offshore wind, Remote Island Wind >5MW, Tidal Stream, Wave 
Lead time before auction  The gap between the announcement of the intention to hold and auction and 
the actual auction have varied from round to round. 
However, once the auction is confirmed a timetable is published in an official 
BEIS Budget Notice. The Budget Notice is based on the Contracts for 
Difference (Allocation) Regulations 2014 which sets out the timetable for the 
conduct of an auction: the start of the allocation round must not be earlier 
than 10 working days after the date of the Budget Notice, and the end must 
be no later than 6 months after the start date. The Notice also includes the 
application closing date (HM Government 2014). 
 
 
                                                             
4 e.g. pyrolysis and gasification 
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As an example, the AR3 had the following timetable (BEIS 2019a):  
 the commencement date of the round was 29 May 2019 
 the application closing date of the round was 18 June 2019 
 successful bids announced 20 September 
 contracts to be signed and returned to LCCC by 18 October 
Min./max. size of project  The eligible technologies and any size restrictions (maximum and minimum) 
are confirmed in the Budget Notice announcing the auction round. 
What is auctioned? 
Auctioned bids (in terms of 
budget, electricity or 
installed capacity) 
The contracts are for output (MWh) based on price. However, the number and 
size of the contracts allocated is restricted by a budget cap. The AR3 has also 
introduced a capacity cap, used as the basis of the budgetary calculation (up 
to 6GW) (BEIS 2019a). 
Budgetary expenditures per 
auction and per year 
The budget cap for individual years is set out in the Budget Notice for the 
auction round.  
CfDs are one of a series of consumer levy-funded instruments constrained by 
a Treasury spending limits. The first two auctions were held in line with a 
system known as the Levy Control Framework (LCF). The LCF was developed 
in 2011 to restrict the aggregate amount of money that suppliers can levy 
from consumers for low carbon electricity and the Capacity Mechanism 
(Lockwood 2016). The budget for an auction is therefore constrained by the 
annual amount available in the LCF. 
Since 2017, however, the LCF has been replaced with a control on the 
introduction of new levies (HM Treasury 2017). The overall budget committed 
to future and ongoing CfD allocation is £557m (2012 prices) and it committed 
only to auctions for ‘less established’ technologies (BEIS 2017d).  
The budget available for a particular auction cycle is announced by the 
Secretary of State for Energy in a budget notice ahead of the auction but not 
ahead of the call for applications. The budget notice sets out the overall size 
of the budget per year and the breakdown by technology group as well as the 
technologies in each group. Importantly, the budgets are for total spending 
for all successful projects in each year, rather than for spending on projects 
which start generating in a particular year. 
All the budgets are calculated on the basis of 2011/12 prices. The budgets 
will be inflated by a consumer prices index (CPI) factor which is set out in the 
Budget Notice officially announcing the auction. 
In response to wider trends in the cost of renewable energy technologies 
(especially offshore wind), the budget cap was very substantially tightened in 
the current auction (AR3). Rather than levy spending constraints, however, 
this is primarily a result of seeking to ensure supply chain consistency with 
budget allocations calculated on the basis of capacity addition targets and 
reflects assumptions about the cost-reductions in key technologies 
illustrated by auctions in the UK and elsewhere. (BEIS 2019a). 
The actual budget (total support payments for all projects) allocated to the 
different technology pots in each of the ARs is shown below:  
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Budgets for Auction Rounds 1 – 3 (prices in 2012GBP) 
 Auction Round 1 (2015) Auction 
Round 2 
(2017) 
Auction 
Round 3 
(2019) 
Delivery 
year 
2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23 2023/24 2024/25 
Pot 1 
(establis
hed) 
50 65 65 65 65 65 0 0 0 0 
Pot 2 
(less 
establis
hed) 
- 155 260 260 260 260 290 290 65 65 
Total 50 230 325 325 325 325 290 290 65 65 
 
Frequency of auctions The execution of the first 2 ARs was delayed be several months from the 
original intended dates. The Government announced in July 2018 that AR3 
would begin in May 2019 and this timetable has been met. It also committed 
to holding an auction round in 2021, and that it intended that further ARs will 
take place every two years from then (HM Government 2018). 
Volume of the tender This varies in each allocation round 
Grid connection/access 
related costs 
Generators connecting to a distribution network pay for the installation of 
‘sole use’ assets to connect the project to the network. In addition, they will 
pay a portion of any cost required to upgrade the network to accommodate 
the new generation. 
Generators connecting to the transmission network pay for the cost of assets 
solely for their own use, but do not generally pay connection charges beyond 
that – ie they do not generally pay for other network upgrades. 
Offshore wind farms have their own transmission arrangements given that 
the projects will require the construction of new assets offshore. Generators 
can choose to build their own assets, and then transfer them to an Offshore 
Transmission Operator (OFTO), or they can allow an OFTO to build the assets. 
The regulator (Ofgem) then conducts competitive tenders between Offshore 
Transmission Operators (OFTOs) to manage the offshore transmission on 
the basis that competition will deliver the best value for money for 
consumers. The overall system operator (National Grid) provides a fixed 20 
year revenue stream to the OFTO. This is linked to the availability of the 
transmission infrastructure rather than the performance of the wind farm, so 
providing a relatively risk free investment opportunity for the OFTO. 
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Generators (including offshore generators) also pay Use of System charges 
and Balancing System Use of System charges at transmission and 
distribution level as appropriate.  These cost vary widely but in 2016 the 
government published cost estimates including ‘connection and use of 
system charges’ that ranged from around £1,300/MW/yr for solar PV and 
onshore wind up to £50, 000/MW/yr for offshore wind farms. However, these 
estimate include the very substantial cost of connecting offshore generation 
to the transmission system which generators in the UK must cover (BEIS 
2016) 
Renewable generators do not have priority access to the grid at either 
distribution or transmission level. 
Balancing and profile costs Under the British Electricity Trading and Transmission (BETTA), all 
participating generators are responsible for paying system balancing if they 
over- or under- generate against their contracted positions. 
There were originally two separate imbalance prices: System Buy Price 
(payment from the seller to the system operator) and System Sell Price 
(payment to the seller from the system operator), although these are now in 
practice the same. The Prices are intended to reflect the costs incurred by the 
system operator (National Grid) to keep the system in balance (ELEXON 
2019). 
Imbalance prices are calculated for each half hour period throughout the day 
to reflect the different levels of supply and demand at different times. So, for 
example, in periods of high demand, imbalance charges could be very high 
because of a lack of availability of low cost generation to compensate for any 
shortfall in contracted generation. See Figure below 
 
 
 
More detail on imbalance pricing can be found at: 
https://www.bmreports.com/bmrs/?q=balancing/systemsellbuyprices 
Partly because of the risks associated with imbalance pricing, and also the 
high transaction costs of participating in BETTA, many independent 
renewable generators sell their output through PPAs with electricity suppliers. 
Larger vertically integrated companies are better able to absorb the risks and 
costs of trading in BETTA. 
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Table 2: Design Elements 
Design elements Description  
Auction format Multi-unit 
Eligible technologies and 
participation technologies? 
Eligible technologies are announced when the auction is confirmed. AR3 
includes a capacity limit of 6GW for all technologies 
Auction procedure  Static (reverse) 
Pre-qualification 
requirements  
- Financial  
- Material (falling either on 
the project developer (e.g. 
experience in RES 
development), or the project 
(e.g. building requirement or 
environmental impact 
assessment, grid 
connection, etc.) 
For AR3, developers are required to show (Low Carbon Contracts Company 
2019a): 
 Connection agreements with the network operator 
 Evidence of planning permission for the project 
 If the project is greater than 300MW, applications will also need a Supply 
Chain Approval Certificate 
In addition, the developer must complete the following before submitting the 
application 
 Declaration that the project will not be cross-subsidised with other 
support mechanisms (eg RO) 
 Evidence of Incorporation, or a list of Parties within an Unincorporated 
Joint Venture 
 Target Commissioning Date window for the project 
 Crown Estate Agreement for lease (Offshore wind only) 
 Provisional capacity requirements for the project (Offshore wind only) 
Auction volume The volume of the auction is primarily determined by budget caps which vary 
for each auction. The budget cap for AR3 is £65 million for projects beginning 
operation in 2023/24 and 2024/25 
Pricing rule Uniform (pay as clear) 
Award procedure Contracts are awarded based on price 
Price limits The Government sets out ceiling prices, known as Administrative Strike 
Prices, for each auction round. 
Support period 15 years 
Favourable treatment of 
specific actors 
Once the auction is announced, there are no special rules or preferences to 
favour different size projects or ownership. 
However, the scope of the auction can clearly favour specific technologies, 
as is shown by the emphasis on Pot 2 technologies in AR2 and AR3. In 
addition, the introduction of Remote Island Wind projects into AR3 as an 
exception to the general policy that onshore wind should not receive public 
subsidy. 
Realisation time limit Contracts are awarded for delivery (ie start up) in a particular year. For 
example, AR3 contracts were awarded for delivery in 2023/24 and 2024/25. 
Project development is therefore driven by the contractual requirement to 
deliver on time. 
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If the project is delayed, there is an additional period of 12 – 24 months 
beyond the original target start date known as the Long Stop. A specified 
proportion of the project must be commissioned by the end of the Long Stop 
period or the contract could be terminated. 
Penalties In the first auction, the penalty for being offered a CfD and refusing to sign it, 
or signing a contract and then failing to deliver the project was exclusion for 
any project at the same location from future auctions for 13 months from the 
date of refusal, or if the contract is withdrawn (DECC 2015b). 
Notably, given the delays between AR1 and AR2, this penalty would not have 
had any practical impact on project developers. 
The rules, known at the Non-Delivery Disincentive, were subsequently 
amended to exclude any CFD Unit (ie the project) OR any other project on the 
same site from future auctions for 13 months from the date of refusal or 
termination, AND to exclude the unit from the first CfD AR taking place within 
24 months of the contract being awarded (Government 2016). 
Way of monitoring progress 
of realisation  
The Low Carbon Contracts Company monitors project progress but does not 
have an obligation to intervene where projects are not on track. Project 
milestones are set out in the contract.  
 
 
Key dates are: 
 Milestone Delivery Date (MDD): the date by which generators must show 
that they are committed to delivering the project, either by providing 
evidence that they have spent 10% of the project’s pre-commissioning 
costs, or evidence of other commitments such as a Board resolution or 
supply contracts. The MDD is 12 months after signing the contract. 
 Operational Conditions Precedent (OCP): evidence of metering, grid 
connection etc. The OCP must be met by the end of the project Longstop 
Date 
 Target Commissioning Window: 12 month period in which the operator 
should begin commissioning the project. 
 Start date 
 Longstop date: the date by which the generator must have 
commissioned the project. 
The LCCC has the right to terminate contracts for projects which do not meet 
the MDD at the beginning of the project, or failed to commission the project 
by the end of the Longstop period except in cases where delay can be shown 
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to be due to force majeure. 
There are a number of other situations in which the LCCC can terminate a 
contract (Low Carbon Contracts Company 2019a). These are: 
 Insolvency of the generator 
 Non-payment by the generator to the LCCC 
 Fraudulent activity by the generator 
 Failure to declare any transfer arrangements 
 Failing to comply with metering requirements 
In cases where there can be deemed to have been a ‘construction event’ the 
initial contract capacity can be altered by up to -25%. The contracted capacity 
cannot be increased. 
Form of support auctioned Support is offered in the form of a fixed price for output through a contract 
for difference.  
In case of premium 
schemes describe the 
method of reference 
wholesale price calculation  
Additional payments per MWh are calculated as the difference between the 
contract or ‘strike price’ (determined through the auction) and a measure of 
the wholesale market price known as the ‘reference price’ (see Figure 4 on 
p10).  
For intermittent generation, the reference price is calculated using the GB Day 
Ahead Hour Price to produce the Intermittent Market Reference Price. 
For baseload generation, the Baseload market Reference Price is calculated 
on a seasonal basis ex post using a traded volume weighted average based 
on forward season data collected during a ‘sample period’ of every trading 
day in the season prior to delivery. The seasons run from 1 April to 30 
September, and 1 October to 31 March (Low Carbon Contracts Company 
2019a). 
In instances where the wholesale power price is higher than the strike price, 
the contract requires that the generator makes payments to the contract 
counterparty.  
Support level adjustments The budgets and strike prices for each AR are published in 2012 prices, which 
allows direct comparison between each auction round. The actual budgets 
are then calculated using the Consumer Price Index Inflator. For AR3, the 
Inflator used for calculating the actual available budget was 1.0193 (BEIS 
2019a). Once awarded, the strike price in the contract can also be adjusted: 
 Annual CPI Indexation for the Strike Price in 2012 prices 
 Adjustment to Balancing System Charges to cover Use of System 
charges and Residual Cashflow Reallocation Cashflow (RCRC). This 
allows the amended strike price to reflect any difference between the 
actual charge paid by the generator and the indexed initial Balancing 
System Charge included in the contract 
 Transmission Losses to reflect any change in the Transmission Loss 
Multiplier, which is an adjustment for transmission losses 
These adjustments differ from generator to generator, and the exact 
conditions and applications are set out in individual CFD contracts 
Transferability of support 
right 
Yes, with the written consent of the LCCC 
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4 Evaluation of the auction results 
This section of the report evaluates the auction system for allocating CfD contracts to renewable electricity 
generators in the UK. First, 4.1 looks at the results of each of the two completed rounds in turn. Secondly, 
4.1.3 updates the earlier AURES report on the UK to evaluate the overall scheme against key criteria for RES 
auction performance. 
 Auction results by round 
This subsection outlines the results of each of the two rounds completed to-date. 
4.1.1 First auction: AR1 (2014-2015) 
Budgets for the first auction were divided into two ‘pots’, one for established technologies, the other for less 
established technologies, effectively creating two simultaneous auction processes.  
The first pot, for established technologies included onshore wind and solar, energy from waste with CHP, 
hydro (>5MW and <50MW), landfill gas and sewage gas. It consisted of £50m for projects commissioning 
from 2015/16, and an additional £15m (i.e. £65m in total) for projects commissioning from 2016/17 
onwards.  
The second pot, for less established technologies, included offshore wind, biomass CHP, wave, tidal stream, 
Advanced Conversion Technologies, Anaerobic Digestion and geothermal. It consisted of £155m for projects 
commissioning from 2016/17 onwards, and an additional £105m (i.e. £260m in total) for projects 
commissioning from 2017/18 onwards.  
There is also a notional third pot, for biomass conversion. However, no budget was allocated to this for the 
first auction. The results of the first allocation round are presented in Table 15: 
Table 3: first CfD allocation auction results (DECC n.d.) 
Project Name Developer Technology MW Strike Price (£) Delivery Year 
BHEG Walsall BH EnergyGap 
(Walsall) Ltd 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
26 114.39 2018-2019 
Energy Works 
(Hull) 
Energy Works 
(Hull) Limited 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
25 119.89 2017-2018 
Enviroparks 
Hirwaun 
Generation Site 
Enviroparks 
Operations Ltd 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
11 119.89 2017-2018 
Wren Power and 
Pulp 
Gent Fairhead & 
Co. Ltd 
Energy from Waste 
with CHP 
49.75 80 2018-2019 
K3 CHP Facility Wheelabrator 
Technologies 
Energy from Waste 
with CHP 
45 80 2018-2019 
EA 1 Scottishpower 
Renewables (UK) 
Offshore Wind 714 119.89 2017-20181 
Neart na Gaoithe Mainstream 
Renewable Power 
Offshore Wind 448 114.39 2018-2019 
Dorenell Wind 
Farm 
Infinergy Onshore Wind 177 82.5 2018-2019 
                                                             
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407059/Contracts_for_Difference_-
_Auction_Results_-_Official_Statistics.pdf  
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Kype Muir Wind 
Farm 
Banks Renewables Onshore Wind 104 82.5 2018-2019 
Clocaenog Forest 
Wind Farm 
RWE Innogy UK 
Limited 
Onshore Wind 96 82.5 2018-2019 
Middle Muir Wind 
Farm 
Banks Renewables Onshore Wind 60 82.5 2018-2019 
Brenig Wind Farm - 
Brenig Wind 
Brenig Wind 
Limited 
Onshore Wind 45 79.23 2016-2017 
4.1.2 Second auction: AR2 (2017) 
Following a commitment by the governing Conservative party not to provide ‘subsidy’ to new onshore wind 
projects, the second auction held in 2017 had budget only for pot 2 (less mature technologies). The budget 
allocation was £290m for projects that deliver in financial years 2021/22 and 2022/23 (BEIS 2017b). A 
maximum volume (150MW) was applied to any ‘fuelled’ renewable energy technology6. The table below 
provides an overview of the auction results: 
Table 4: Second CfD allocation auction results (BEIS n.d.) 
Project Name Developer Technology MW Strike Price (£) Delivery Year 
Drakelow 
Renewable Energy 
Centre 
Future Earth 
Energy (Drakelow) 
Limited 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
15.00 74.75 2021/22 
Station Yard CFD 1 DC2 Engineering 
Ltd 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
0.05 74.75 2021/22 
Northacre 
Renewable Energy 
Centre 
Northacre 
Renewable Energy 
Limited 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
25.50 74.75 2021/22 
IPIF Fort Industrial 
REC 
Legal and General 
Prop Partners (Ind 
Fund) Ltd 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
10.20 74.75 2021/22 
Blackbridge TGS 1 
Limited 
Think Greenergy 
TOPCO Limited 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
5.56 74.75 2021/22 
Redruth EfW Redruth EFW 
Limited 
Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
8.00 40.00 2022/23 
Grangemouth 
Renewable Energy 
Plant 
Grangemouth 
Renewable Energy 
Limited 
Dedicated 
Biomass with CHP 
85.00 74.75 2021/22 
Rebellion Rebellion Biomass 
LLP 
Dedicated 
Biomass with CHP 
0.64 74.75 2021/22 
Triton Knoll 
Offshore Wind 
Farm 
Triton Knoll 
Offshore Wind 
Farm Limited 
Offshore Wind 860.00 74.75 2021/22 
Hornsea Project 2 Breesea Limited Offshore Wind 1,386.00 57.50 2022/23 
Moray Offshore 
Windfarm (East) 
Moray Offshore 
Windfarm (East) 
Limited 
Offshore Wind 950.00 57.50 2022/23 
                                                             
6 Dedicated Biomass with CHP, Advanced Conversion Technologies (with or without CHP) and Anaerobic Digestion (with 
or without CHP) 
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4.1.3 Third auction: AR3 (2019) 
The third allocation round in 2019 was again open only to ‘pot 2’, less mature technologies. £65m in support 
payments were available for projects delivering in 2023/24 or 2024/25 (BEIS 2019a). Included in the auction 
was a new category of technology ‘remote island wind’ including onshore wind farms on isolated Scottish 
islands. The table below provides an overview of the results: 
Table 5: Third allocation round results (BEIS 2019b): 
Project Name Developer Technology MW Strike Price (£) Delivery Year 
Bulwell Energy 
Limited 
Bulwell Energy Limited Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
27.5 39.65 2023/24 
Small Heath Bio 
Power Limited 
Small Heath Bio Power Limited Advanced 
Conversion 
Technologies 
6.1 41.611 2024/25 
Costa Head 
Wind 
Costa Head Wind Farm Limited Remote Island 
Wind 
16.32 39.65 2023/24 
Druim Leathann 
Windfarm 
Limited 
Druim Leathann Windfarm 
Limited 
Remote Island 
Wind 
49.5 41.611 2024/25 
Hesta Head 
Wind 
Hesta Head Wind Farm Limited Remote Island 
Wind 
20.4 39.65 2023/24 
Muaitheabhal 
Wind Farm 
Uisenis Power Limited Remote Island 
Wind 
189 39.65 2023/24 
Doggerbank 
Creyke Beck A 
P1 
DoggerbankOffshoreWindFarm 
Project1ProjcoLimited 
Offshore Wind 1200 39.65 2023/24 
Doggerbank 
Creyke Beck B 
P1 
DoggerbankOffshoreWindFarm 
Project2ProjcoLimited 
Offshore Wind 1200 41.611 2024/25 
Doggerbank 
Teeside A P1 
DoggerbankOffshoreWindFarm 
Project3ProjcoLimited 
Offshore Wind 1200 41.611 2024/25 
Forthwind 
Forthwind Limited Offshore Wind 12 39.65 2023/24 
Seagreen Phase 
1 
Seagreen Wind Energy Limited Offshore Wind 454 41.611 2024/25 
Sofia Offshore 
Wind Farm 
Phase 1 
Sofia Offshore Wind Farm Limited Offshore Wind 1400 39.65 2023/24 
 
 Evaluation against key criteria 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the auctions requires an interpretation of the policy goals for the project, 
which may not always cohere with the rationale provided explicitly. For the UK CfD auction scheme, the most 
important goals are seen to be:  
i. Delivery of low carbon capacity within a strict budget limit 
ii. the ability to reveal “true” short-term project costs through the application of competitive pressures  
iii. the effectiveness within which the instrument allocates the budget to projects that can and will 
deliver promised renewable generation capacity and 
iv. the ability to contribute to ongoing innovation that may deliver on goals such as long-term cost 
reduction 
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4.2.1 Policy effectiveness (effectiveness of auctions) 
4.2.1.1 Budget allocation 
As a budget allocation system, the CfD auction of 2014/15 was a limited success with a failure to allocate 
large sums of budget in the first four of the six years for which a budget was set but successful allocation of 
the budgets in later years (Figure 6). It is notable that the total spending commitment for the first delivery 
year is actually slightly negative. This is because the successful bids were lower than the reference wholesale 
power price assumption for that year, meaning that the two-way CfD, in which the generator must pay back 
any revenues above their strike price, would be forecast to be revenue-positive for the government-owned 
counterparty (LCCC). 
Overall, the average proportion of the annual budget allocated in AR1 was low, although the peak total support 
cost forecast in delivery year 2020/21is close to the annual budget cap of £325m – the point beyond which 
the year closes for new projects. In AR2, the peak estimated support cost occurs in valuation year 2023/24 
at £176m, some way short of the total available budget of £290m. 
 
Figure 7: Budget versus total spend 
The failure to allocate much of the AR1 pot 1 budget in 2015, 2016 and 2017 may be attributable to the 
external policy environment. Large-scale (>5MW) solar projects were prevented from accessing the major 
alternative policy, the RO from April 2015 because solar was ‘deploying faster than could be afforded’ (DECC, 
2014f, p.12). 
The third auction round saw contract prices lower than the projected electricity market reference prices used 
to calculate the budgetary impact. The nature of the CfD used in the UK, which requires generators to ‘pay 
back’ when market prices are lower than references prices results in very strongly negative spend (i.e. net 
revenues to generators that are lower than the projected wholesale price of electricity). One consequence of 
this reversal in budgetary impact was that rather than a budgetary cap, the 6GW capacity cap introduced for 
this round appears to have been the main constraint. A total of 5,775MW was offered contracts, slightly lower 
than the cap. Also, the winning offshore wind farms appear to have been awarded their full consented 
capacity, rather than lower capacity, higher unit cost ‘flexible bid’ alternatives also invited (see section 3.4). 
Since the budget profile was more-or-less flat from 2017 to 2020/21 and each project’s cost is counted in 
every year, the later years of the allocation was likely to fill up first, depending on the order in which budget 
years’ budget cap was reached and the year closed for new projects. Put another way, the first delivery year 
could only fill up with projects wishing to start on that date while later years would have to account for 
projects starting in earlier years (see Section 3.3). 
-£300,000,000
-£200,000,000
-£100,000,000
 £-
 £100,000,000
 £200,000,000
 £300,000,000
 £400,000,000
Budget
Total Spend
  
 24  
The ’valuation year’ for large projects may also differ from the delivery year; offshore wind developments are 
permitted to phase commissioning with valuation taking place up to two years following the target 
commissioning date (BEIS 2019a). 
4.2.1.2 Project realisation 
In the original AURES report addressing the UK, no empirical assessment could be made of project realisation 
since none of the contracted projects were due for completion. However, the second auction, AR1 allocated 
contracts to  projects aiming to complete between 2015/16 and 2018/19, enabling an evaluation. As can be 
seen from the table below, many projects are now online. However, the table also shows that: 
 Many of the projects missed the Delivery Year for which they were awarded a CfD. One project, Neart 
na Gaoithe offshore wind farm has experienced significant delays because of opposition to the 
environmental impacts of the projects. The LCCC terminated the contract for the project in May 2016 
because of the delays caused by the dispute, but following an appeal by the developers (Mainstream 
Renewable Power) the contract was reinstated in March 2017 (Low Carbon Contracts Company 
2019b).  The original delivery year for the project was 2018-19, but this has now been delayed to 
2022. 
 Others – eg Brenig Wind Farm and Solwaybank Wind Farm - have also experienced delays of several 
months. 
 In addition to the Neart na Gaoithe episode, 3 contracts have been terminated to date (July 2019). 
Netley Landfill Solar was terminated because the LCCC refused to extend the project’s Milestone 
Delivery Date deadline (NAO 2018; Solar Power Portal 2016).  The reasons behind the termination of 
the contracts for two ACT plants (Enviroparks Hirwaun and BHEG Walsall) are not public, but could 
include not being able to secure a timely and affordable grid connection, or a change in the project’s 
viability. 
 Two PV projects originally offered a CfD on the basis of a very low strike price did not sign the 
contracts. The low price of the CfD is a clear indication of strategic bidding on the part of the project 
developers (further details below). 
It should be noted firstly that the volume of terminated contracts is extremely small compared to overall 
auctioned volumes. Secondly, the delays beyond the target commissioning date of some projects are within 
the force majeur contingencies or other reason afforded by the contract. While overall project delivery in 
terms of both capacity and number of projects delivered is good, it is clear that ACT and solar projects have 
not performed well, and many projects have experienced delays. 
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Table 6: Project milestone progress for awarded projects 
 
 
It is too early to meaningfully evaluate realisation rates for AR2. However, it is notable that 4 of the 8 
ACT/biomass projects offered contracts are no longer part of the CfD scheme. One – Redruth ACT – did not 
sign a contract as it had bid unsustainably low in the auction round. Three others – Drakelow, Station Yard 
and Grangemouth – have had their contracts terminated for not achieving the MDD. It is not always clear 
what the reason behind this is. Drakelow has been redesigned and will apparently be built and operated 
subsidy-free. Station Yard and Grangemouth both failed to reach the MDD target, though there is no 
information on what the problems were with the projects.  Some other projects – eg IPIF Fort Industrial REC 
– are experiencing minor delays on their target commissioning date. 
 
Table 7: Allocation Round 2 progress 
 
Technology
Capacity 
(including 
any 
reductions)
Initial 
strike 
price 
(£/MWh)
Current 
strike 
price 
(£/MWh)
Delivery 
year 
01/04/xx - 
31.03/xx
Target 
commissioning 
date
Actual start 
date
Generator's 
expected 
start date
Contract 
termination 
date
Enviroparks Hirwaun Generation ACT 11 119.89 134.86 2017-18 31/03/18 29/05/19
Energy Works (Hull) ACT 25 119.89 134.86 2017-18 01/01/18 31/08/19
BHEG Walsall ACT 23.4 114.39 128.67 2018-19 01/12/18 15/05/19
Wren Power and Pulp EfW with CHP 49.75 80 89.99 2018-19 30/05/18 Not specified
K3 CHP Facility EfW with CHP 45 80 89.99 2018-19 15/12/18 11/11/19
EA Phase 1 Offshore wind 179 119.89 136.08 2017-18 31/03/18 21/08/19
EA Phase 2 Offshore wind 285 119.89 136.08 31/03/19 27/11/19
EA Phase 3 Offshore wind 250 119.89 136.08 31/03/20 29/03/20
Neart na Gaoithe Offshore wind 448 114.39 129.88 2018-19 31/03/22 15/09/22
Brenig Wind Farm Onshore wind 38.6 79.23 89.12 2016-17 30/03/17 29/03/19
Sneddon Law Community Wind Farm Onshore wind 30 79.99 89.98 2017-18 30/06/17 Under review
Mynydd Y Gwair Wind Farm Onshore wind 33.6 79.99 89.98 2017-18 31/03/18 20/03/19
Middle Muir Wind Farm Onshore wind 50.73 82.5 93.92 2018-19 31/03/19 09/01/19
Common Barn Wind Farm Onshore wind 6.15 82.5 92.8 2018-19 30/03/19 18/06/18
Moor House Wind Farm Onshore wind 11.96 82.5 92.8 2018-19 29/09/18 03/04/18
Kype Muir Wind Farm Onshore wind 88.4 82.5 93.92 2018-19 31/03/19 02/03/19
Tralorg Wind Farm Onshore wind 18.8 82.5 93.92 2018-19 30/06/18 20/12/19
Clocaenog Forest Wind Farm Onshore wind 96 82.5 92.8 2018-19 01/11/18 05/09/19
Bad a Cheo Wind Farm Onshore wind 26.65 82.5 93.92 2018-19 31/03/19 31/03/19
Nanclach Wind Farm Onshore wind 39.1 82.5 92.8 2018-19 31/10/18 13/07/19
Achlackan Wind Farm Onshore wind 10 82.5 92.8 2018-19 31/10/18 08/04/19
Coire Na Cloiche Windfarm Onshore wind 30 82.5 92.8 2018-19 31/10/18 15/05/19
Dorenell Wind Farm Onshore wind 177 82.5 93.92 2018-19 30/04/19 20/12/18
Solwaybank Wind Farm Onshore wind 30 82.5 92.8 2018-19 29/03/19 30/01/20
Wick Farm Solar Park Solar PV 19.1 50 2015-16 Not signed
Netley Landfill Solar Solar PV 12 79.23 83.22 2016-17 31/6/16 21/03/16
Royston Solar Farm Solar PV 13.78 50 Not signed
Charity Farm Solar PV 13.74 79.23 89.12 2016-17 30/06/16 30/06/16
Triangle Farm Solar Solar PV 10.9 79.23 89.12 2016-17 01/07/16 18/07/17
Projects delivered later, or projected to deliver later than their CfD Delivery Year
Contracts terminated, not signed or under review
Technology
Capacity 
(MW)
Strike price 
(£/MWh) 
2012 prices
Delivery 
year
Target 
commissioning 
date
Expected 
start date
Contract 
termination 
date
Drakelow renewable energy centre ACT 15 74.75 2021/22 01/04/21 09/11/18
Station Yard CFD 1 ACT 0.05 74.75 2021/22 01/04/21 02/10/18
Northacre Renewable Energy Centre ACT 25.5 74.75 2021/22 01/04/21 01/04/21
IPIF Fort Industrial REC ACT 10.2 74.75 2021/22 01/12/21 01/03/22
Blackbridge TGS1 ACT 5.56 74.75 2021/22 01/04/21 01/04/21
Redruth EfW ACT 8 40 2022/23 Not signed
Grangemouth Renewable Energy PlantBiomass with CHP 85 74.75 2021/22 01/07/21 08/10/18
Rebellion Biomass with CHP 0.64 74.75 2021/22 01/04/21 01/04/21
Triton Knoll Offshore Wind Farm Offshore wind 860 74.75 2021/22 01/04/21 02/05/21
Hornsea Project 2 Offshore wind 1386 57.5 2022/23 31/03/23 03/04/23
Moray Offshore Windfarm (East) Offshore wind 950 57.5 2022/23 01/04/22 03/04/22
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4.2.2 Static efficiency or cost effectiveness 
The average contract prices achieved in the first and second auction round appear to be competitive when 
compared with the administrative strike prices determined for those auctions as well as the Final Investment 
Decision (FIDeR) contracts bilaterally awarded to several offshore wind farms in 2014 (see (Fitch-Roy and 
Woodman 2016) for more detail on the FIDeR contracts).  
 
Figure 8: Auction outturn prices (auctions prices weighted by project capacity) (BEIS 2017b; BEIS n.d.; DECC 
2015a; National Audit Office 2014) 
One notable feature of the auction outcome was the very low pot 1 (established technologies) clearing price 
for the first delivery year (Figure 9). The only projects awarded contracts in that year were two solar farms 
offered contracts at £50/MWh. The developers of these projects have since declined to sign the offered 
contract with one stating that £50 was never a feasible price at which to build a project (Business Green 
2015). The pay-as-clear pricing rule may have contributed to the perception by some bidders that a very low 
bid was the only way to win a contract. Also, the very small penalties (which, since another auction was not 
held within 13 months of the first auction have turned out to be zero) contributed to the decision making of 
bidders placing very low bids. 
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Figure 9: Pot 1 auction results and ceiling prices of winning technologies 
While the projects did place bids in the knowledge that they were not commercially viable, clearly there was 
an expectation that at least one project would place a bid in their delivery year which would clear the auction 
at a viable price. A calculation that the downside of bidding a commercial price and missing out on a contract 
by a small margin was seen to be greater than receiving a contract at too low a price and rejecting it. The 
fact that solar was excluded from any other policy revenue stream in the run up to the auction may have also 
been a factor in this strategy, as did the relatively small non-delivery penalty of exclusion from CfD auctions 
for 13 months7. Since data concerning unsuccessful bids are unavailable, it is not possible to know whether 
other bidders pursued a similar strategy but the decision to run the auctions as pay-as-clear, taken late in the 
design process (DECC 2014b), may have contributed to this kind of ‘over optimistic’ bidding behaviour. 
A similar picture of strategic bidding appears to be present in the Redruth ACT project in AR2. The developer 
appears to have placed an unsustainably low bid in an attempt to gain a contract but was subsequently 
unable to sign a CfD. 
As explained below, some controversy surrounded the AR2 due to changes in the way the 150MW capacity 
cap on ‘fuelled technologies’ was implemented. Essentially, a rule change to prevent large fuelled projects 
from ‘blocking’ capacity combined with the ability for bidders to submit multiple ‘flexible’ bids created a 
situation in which larger fuelled projects were rejected in favour of smaller, more expensive ones, thereby 
increasing the clearing price paid to very large offshore wind farms (although still well below the ceiling price) 
and therefore greater than necessary expenditure (NAO 2018). 
The National Audit Office is a Parliamentary body which scrutinises Government spending of public money. 
In 2018 it published a report on AR2, and whether its design had led to higher costs for consumers (National 
Audit Office 2018). The report focuses on the changes made to how a capacity cap operated. In AR1, if any 
capacity cap was breached, the auction would stop for any projects. However, for AR2, BEIS changed this 
rule to allow the auction to continue for other projects of the same technology even if the cap had been 
breached by one project. The other projects bidding at the same or higher price would be awarded a contract 
                                                             
7 In fact it looks likely that the bidders would not face any penalty since the second auction has been delayed 
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as long as they themselves came in under the capacity cap and did not exceed the budget cap. 
AR2 had a capacity cap of 150MW for fuelled technologies (ie biomass). The practical impact of the changes 
outlined above was that some larger projects were excluded from the auction, while smaller projects were 
awarded contracts even though they were bidding at a higher price than the large projects. This in turn meant 
that the small projects awarded contracts pulled up the strike prices for other projects in that delivery year. 
In the 2021/22 delivery year, ACT projects set the strike price of £74.75/MWh, and this was also therefore 
awarded to the Triton Knoll offshore wind farm which is also meant to begin operation in 2021/22 (BEIS n.d.) 
However, offshore wind farms bidding for the 2022/23 delivery year (where there were no ACT bids) were 
awarded a strike price of £57.50, leading to concern that the Triton Knoll offshore wind project had been over 
rewarded as a result of the price setting by small ACT projects. The National Audit office obtained the bid 
data (not publicly available) and has calculated that this will cost consumers around £1.5 billion over the 
course of the 15 year contracts.  
There are clearly some scenarios when this rule change could have resulted in lower prices, particularly if 
offshore wind projects had bid at the higher prices predicted by the Government at the beginning of the 
auction process. However, this episode emphasises the importance of getting specific details ‘right’ when 
designing auctions. 
 
Some of the dramatic falls in technology costs cause potential cost effectiveness difficulties in the legal 
flexibility allowed for in the contract. For example, the Neart na Gaoithe offshore wind farm contract was 
reinstated following a successful appeal asserting that the problems faced by the project fell within the force 
majeur provisions (see previous section). However, the value to the developer of delivering later than 
originally forecast is likely very high given the strong falls in technology costs. In essence, the developer will 
be able to deliver the project for lower capital costs than reflected in the original auction price. 
4.2.3 Dynamic efficiency 
The ability of the CfD auction system to promote continued reduction in energy costs from the targeted 
technologies is mixed. There has been a very strong emphasis in the auctions in favour of immature 
technology, particularly offshore wind, and mature technologies have been excluded since AR1.  Similarly the 
ability of the system to impose minimum contributions for particular technologies has the potential to 
support innovation in less mature sectors.  
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Figure 10: Capacity allocation by technology and by allocation round across both technology groups 
The impact of the decision to make three quarters of the funds available to the less-established technology 
group is illustrated clearly by the fact that more than half of the capacity contracted by the first auction was 
offshore wind, a pattern that intensified in the second and third allocation rounds. Overall, 87% of the capacity 
offered contracts in the first three rounds was to offshore wind projects. 
Pot 2, for less established technologies appeared to offer a result more in line with expectation with the 
clearing price significantly lower than the administratively determined ceiling price in all years for which 
contracts have been allocated but within the range understood to be viable. Note the strong divergence 
between offshore wind technology and other pot 2 technologies as the ceiling price was reduced dramatically 
in preparation for allocation round 3 (for delivery between 2023 and 2025) (BEIS 2019a). This is illustrated 
clearly in the figure below. It is notable that AR3 displayed an increase in price for the later of its two delivery 
years, reversing the pattern of the two earlier rounds. 
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Figure 11: Pot 2 auction results and ceiling prices (administrative strike prices) of winning technologies 
 
Another decision which had a significant impact on the outcomes was to include both wind and solar in the 
same technology group in allocation round 1 in 2015. Competition between the technologies meant that 
onshore wind - which is currently accepted to be cheaper than solar in the UK - was awarded the vast majority 
of the capacity in pot 1.  
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5 Conclusions 
Design of the UK auction is complex, which could act as a barrier to entry for small players. The emphasis 
on offshore wind has led to dramatic price falls, and is a key element of the UK’s Industrial Strategy with the 
only suggestion of a long term programme of auctions directed at that sector. However, this had led to a lack 
of diversity in the UK’s renewable mix which will only increase in coming years. 
The success rate (in terms of number of projects rather than capacity) is not perfect, with projects in both 
AR1 and AR2 having their contracts terminated. ACTs seem particularly vulnerable. The reasons for this are 
not clear although the overall impact on delivery volumes is small enough to be considered negligible so long 
as supporting specific technologies is not a strong policy objective. 
There is evidence of strategic bidding in both AR1 (solar pv projects) and AR2 (Redruth ACT). In both auction 
rounds, developers put in ‘aggressively’ low bids in the hope of gaining a contract but other projects did not 
raise the prices in the delivery year for which they were bidding. 
Only one CfD round has taken place to date, and the projects awarded contracts are still under construction. 
It is therefore too early to make definitive statements about the effectiveness of the mechanism in the UK. 
However, there are some points which are worth raising as possible future lessons: 
 While the high level design of the auction process is reasonably straightforward, allocation of the 
contracts is complex compared to auctions in other countries 
 Pay as clear and low non-delivery penalties encouraged bidders to keep away from the margin with 
some unfeasibly low bids in both completed auctions 
 Separate clearing prices for each year mean that there was always a risk that a low bid would be 
the marginal bid 
 In the first two years this was magnified by the split of the RO phase out – two years earlier for 
solar than wind 
 Few solar projects appear to have even bid. This may be due to solar developers choosing to finish 
RO projects before their cut off, focusing on the non-CfD sub 5MW projects to avoid the cost/risk 
of an auction,  
 The complex auction design favoured large or sophisticated actors able to navigate the quite 
complex process 
 While the ASP is an administrative process, the split between pots was very much a political 
decision taken by the Secretary of State for Energy. The budget split was very favourable to 
offshore wind…(as a political priority) 
 Since the budget is announced per auction through the budget notice there is no long term signal 
about future prices in any future auctions. It is clear that there was strategic bidding from at least 
one solar developer who was subsequently unable to sign a CfD contract. However, the penalty for 
failing to do so (exclusion from any future auctions within 13 months) is insignificant given that the 
irregularity with which auctions have been held to-date 
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APPENDIX 
 
Interviews conducted for this update report 
Carly Leighton. Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 23/4/2019 
Alex Coulton. Low Carbon Contracts Company. 08/7/2019. 
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